The announcement by the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Prof. Attahiru Jega, that the 2015 elections would be postponed for six weeks was not a total surprise. Several weeks earlier, members of President Goodluck Jonathan’s inner circle, particularly the National Security Advisor, Col. Sambo Dasuki, and leaders of the Peoples Democratic Party, had begun to lay the groundwork for a postponement. Their remarks focused on the deteriorating security situation in the northeastern states and concerns over the challenges faced by INEC in distributing the Permanent Voter Cards. Yet, in his press conference, Jega stated that INEC was ready to proceed on time. As he later described it, the INEC decision to postpone the vote was strictly security-based, in response to a direct request from the military and concerns that the safety of poll workers and voters in the northeast could not be assured.
Given that this announcement was one of the first acknowledgements by the Jonathan administration of how badly the Nigerian military had bungled the fight against Boko Haram, the stakes-politically and militarily- could not be higher. Within the political class, there are at least two competing arguments about what the delay will eventually mean, both for the current security situation as well as the future of the country’s democratic institutions.
On the optimistic side is Dasuki’s speech at Chatham House in London on January 22, 2015. In an interview a few days after Jega’s announcement, Dasuki offered a spirited defence of the postponement. His most notable claim was that the delay would enable the Nigerian Army (now supported by Chadian and Nigerien forces, and with a potential 8,000-plus African Union force on the way) to launch a devastating counterstrike against Boko Haram, ensuring that the elections could proceed nationwide without the threat of violence. He promised that by late March “all known Boko Haram camps (would) be taken out. They won’t be there. They will be dismantled.”
Subsequent comments by President Jonathan and others walked back from this specific timetable, but the word from the Presidency and leading military spokesmen has been one of unremitting confidence. For his part, Dasuki argued that the delay should be understood as a non-partisan act and provides no special advantage to either of the major parties. And, in an obvious retort to Jega, he stated that, despite INEC’s assertion that it was prepared for the vote, the additional time would ensure that a satisfactory percentage of the PVCs would be made available to the electorate.
The second perspective was expressed most cogently in an interview, soon after INEC’s announcement, by Clement Nwankwo, one of Nigeria’s respected human rights advocates and the head of the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, a major election monitoring group. In an exchange with the BBC’s Will Ross, Nwankwo argued that given the unlikelihood that the Nigerian military – consistently outgunned on the battlefield – would be able to alter the situation in six weeks, the only explanation for the delay was a desire to undermine the democratic process. It was hard to believe, he claimed, given the growing support for the opposition All Progressives Congress, that there was not an “… intention here not to conduct elections.” The APC presidential candidate, Maj Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, has been circumspect in his reaction to the postponement, insisting that his campaign would continue. Despite the happy front the APC officials have put on regarding their electoral chances, concerns about their party’s financial constraints, or of possible PDP manipulation of the election process, have grown louder.
Several questions can be considered here. Can Boko Haram be stopped in its tracks, an outcome likely to result in a Jonathan/PDP victory? Will Buhari succeed as a presidential candidate the fourth time round, buoyed by the continued failure of the Nigerian military and more high profile Boko Haram advances? Will the elections be tainted by rigging and violence or, even worse, cancelled with the declaration of a national emergency? Uncertainty prevails. Nevertheless, the pre-election ramping up of the fight against Boko Haram will likely play a major role in influencing the country’s democratic future.
To understand how Nigeria arrived at its current “fight or vote” dilemma, it is important to understand the forces behind Boko Haram’s meteoric rise since late 2013. Although the group’s origins can be traced to the early days of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999 to the present), the current phase of the insurgency involves a series of events that seemed to presage its defeat.
The first was the declaration of a state of emergency in the two states most affected by the violence (Borno and Yobe), as well as a third (Adamawa) that had not yet become a key target. Despite the efforts of the Jonathan administration and the military to justify this decision as part of a broader strategic plan, the impact on local residents was catastrophic. Mobile communications networks were severed for months, perhaps hampering Boko Haram but also constraining local commerce. Reports of tensions between security forces and local community leaders, many of whom felt disrespected or even targeted as Boko Haram sympathisers, spiralled into mutual distrust and a decline in cooperation.
The second event was the ramping up of “Operation Flush,” an offensive designed by the Joint Task Force and the Nigerian Army to drive the militants out of their strongholds (particularly in and around Maiduguri). In the middle of 2013, state forces experienced unprecedented levels of success, increasing the prospect that the insurgency might actually be crushed. In October 2013, Adam Nossiter of the New York Times a confidential military source who suggested that the country could be three weeks away from peace.
The third development was the emergence of a loose network of vigilante groups-many operating under the name of the “Civilian” JTF-to assist the national security forces and protect local property and lives. These vigilantes were key players in the push against Boko Haram throughout the last half of 2013, but they quickly developed reputations for being brutal and merciless in the treatment of suspected members of Boko Haram. As several international human rights organisations reported, the Civilian JTF and their military allies stand accused of summary executions of hundreds of local young men, many of whom were detained on the slightest suspicion. Combined with the violence against civilians perpetrated by official security forces, Amnesty International estimates that in 2013 more Nigerians died at the hands of those fighting the insurgency than were killed by Boko Haram.
In combination, these factors set the stage for a dramatic transformation in Boko Haram’s fortunes. Despite forcing the militants to retreat into the countryside, Operation Flush and the Civilian JFT exacted an enormous toll on the residents of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. Added to the severe economic disruptions caused by the state of emergency, Boko Haram operated among an increasingly weak, disorganised, and displaced civilian population.
Punch
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